Competitive strategies in oligopolies: The impact of asymmetric information and strategic behavior
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54167/ejbei.v2i2.1815Keywords:
Asymmetric Information, Behavioral Economics, Game Theory, Tacit Collusion, Market Power, Pricing, Algorithmic Competition, Econometric ModelsAbstract
This study analyzes the strategic effects of asymmetric access to information in oligopolistic markets, combining classical and behavioral game theory within a unified econometric framework. Using linear regression, Logit and Probit models, the research evaluates how unequal data availability impacts pricing strategies and market dominance, focusing on sectors such as telecommunications and energy. The findings demonstrate that informational asymmetry reinforces structural advantages, enabling predictive behavior and tacit coordination, often resulting in higher prices and reduced competition. Furthermore, the study incorporates cognitive biases—particularly loss aversion—showing that firms deviate from rational expectations under uncertainty. The article concludes with public policy proposals aimed at reducing informational asymmetries through regulatory transparency and algorithmic accountability.
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